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PRIVATE OR PUBLIC? THE DUTCH DEBATE ABOUT 
SOCIAL INSURANCE STATISTICS (1900-1940)
LOES VAN DER VALK
The Dutch Workman’s Compensation Act implemented a new central public 
agency - the Rijks Verzekeringsbank (State Insurance Bank) – which had to 
collect and manage all information from insured companies and employees. 
The Dutch employers, however, were very reluctant to provide the necessary 
information to the government. They were opposed to bureaucratic centralisa-
tion and preferred private insurance agencies. What were the consequences of 
this attitude for the relevant statistics about enterprises, wages and accidents 
and what did this resistance of employers mean for the statistical information 
of the Sickness Benefi t Act of 1929? 
With the introduction of compulsory social insurance in Germany in the 
1880s, Otto von Bismarck set an impressive example for social policy in the 
developing industrial society. Other countries imitated Bismarck’s policy and 
adapted his initiative to their own national needs. The early experience with 
social security in Germany and other countries produced crucial actuarial 
knowledge that was needed to establish the right levels of social security 
contributions and to reduce fi nancial risks for the social funds involved. 
These statistical data were also used by countries which introduced social 
security but had no actuarial data of their own. In the Netherlands, the fi rst 
Dutch compulsory social security law was passed in 1901: the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, which was modelled on an Austrian law and used Austrian 
actuarial data. A special national insurance bank, the Rijksverzekeringsbank 
(RVB) was set up to implement and manage this legislation. This issue was 
highly controversial and a discussion developed on the nature of the organisa-
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tion responsible for managing social security: should it be private or public? 
Both options were introduced. 
This contribution analyses the debate about the social security data as they 
gradually became available in the Netherlands. We will examine how the 
statistical treatment of risk calculation developed. The statistical authorities 
seized the opportunity to use the social insurance data as a cheap source of 
important new information about social and economic conditions in the 
developing industry of the Netherlands. The collection of social data by the 
government itself was very meagre. This chapter also looks into the extent 
to which the content of the statistics was determined by (fi nancial) manage-
ment information needs alone, or whether other objectives of social policy 
and social statistics were also pursued? Finally, we will investigate whether the 
debate on social statistics under the compensation act affected future social 
insurance legislation, the Sickness Benefi t Act in particular.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act 1901
 
In the nineteenth century voluntary compensation schemes for industrial 
injuries had met with little success. A few employers compensated injured 
workers through their company’s sick fund, others paid a small indemnity, 
but on the whole industry transferred the costs of an industrial accident to 
the injured worker. In the end, it was the community that had to pay, as the 
worker often had to apply for poor relief. Two surveys, one of working condi-
tions and one of voluntary provisions revealed how serious the problem was.1 
Reports by the Arbeidsinspectie (Labour Inspectorate), established only in 1890, 
confi rmed these fi ndings. These reports produced some quantitative data, but 
not enough to give an insight into industrial injuries and the resulting costs 
of medical treatment and loss of income.
The preparation of legislation in this fi eld had to depend on experiences 
in other countries. The German model did not fi t, as the structure of Dutch 
industry was smaller in scale and therefore an organisational structure based 
on sectors of industry was considered unsuitable. German employers were 
enrolled in mandatory mutual insurance funds connected with each sector of 
industry. The Dutch government proposed a system similar to that in Austria, 
the fi rst country to follow Germany, where the law was administered by a 
state insurance agency. This agency defrayed the costs according to the total 
payroll of each fi rm, taking into account a particular risk category assigned 
to the fi rm by the agency.
 1  Struve and Bekaar, Nijverheidsenquête 1887-1889; Fondsenenquête 1896, IISH 
archives IISG archives; Fondsen-enquete 1896.
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While the bill was still being debated, many people criticised the idea of 
centralisation by means of a government agency, the State Insurance Bank (the 
RVB). In their view, this would only serve to discourage private enterprises 
from developing policies aimed at preventing accidents. In spite of this, the 
Second Chamber of Parliament adopted the bill without major amendments. 
Again, a number of employers organised a campaign against the principle of 
state monopoly of the insurance, which resulted in the defeat of the bill in 
the First Chamber. Employers feared that the bill would diminish their hold 
on the workforce and would indirectly involve the state in their companies.2 
They demanded freedom of choice in how they were to meet the legal in-
surance obligations. Within a few months, the government presented a new 
bill in which the idea of central insurance was abandoned. Companies had 
the choice between bearing their own risk, using a commercial insurance 
company, organising a mutual indemnity fund or joining the State Insurance 
Bank, the RVB.3 The introduction of a free choice of insurer did not alter the 
obligation to supply the required information on wages, workforce, machines 
etc. to the RVB. 
The compensation act was to come into effect in 1903. The RVB was soon 
established and began to register the industrial companies which had to be 
insured under the law. In the meantime commercial insurance companies 
developed compensation contracts. A number of large companies together 
founded De Risico-Bank4, which was to become the main rival of the RVB 
and the protagonist of the do-it-yourself ideology. It was meant to overcome 
employers’ objections to the proposed state system. Instead of a contributory 
system, which was thought to be unfair to low risk enterprises, it introduced 
a pay-as-you-go system, where industrial insurance boards apportioned the 
real costs of accidents. This system of mutual insurance would encourage the 
introduction of safety measures, as they would immediately result in lower 
costs, De Risico-Bank argued.5 
Although the amendment of the original bill had silenced the opposition, 
the result was a hybrid administrative structure. Under free market conditions, 
insurers would verify claims and keep the injured employees under supervi-
sion. Under the Dutch compensation act, however, the RVB settled the claims 
 2  The fact that the employers’ liability for work-related injuries would no 
longer exist was an important point in favour. B. Barentsen, Arbeidsongeschiktheid, 15. 
See also Van Gerwen, ‘A statistical latecomer’, in this volume.
 3  Roebroek and Hertogh, De beschavende invloed des tijds, 132-135. 
 4  In full: Centrale Werkgevers Risico-Bank: central employers’ liability agen-
cy.
 5  De Centrale Werkgevers Risico-Bank 1902-1927, 18-19. Van Gerwen, De 
ontluikende verzorgingsstaat, 168.
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of all industrial workers covered by the law, and subsequently recovered the 
costs from the employers or their private insurers. In cases where a worker 
remained disabled the employer or his insurer had to deposit the capitalised 
value of the corresponding benefi t. This procedure was supposed to guarantee 
entitlement as a public right and guarantee the payments, even in the event 
of bankruptcy or liquidation of the enterprise. The RVB received all the in-
dividual fi les of the injured labourers, including those who were insured by 
private parties. Conditions that might infl uence accidents – like time, place, 
company and trade, wage, position in workforce, nature of accident, age − 
were also monitored.
The scope of the scheme was limited to “dangerous trades” and covered 
about 30 percent of wage earners. In 1921 the law was revised and applied to 
employers in general. Moreover, the defi nition changed from “occupational 
hazards” to “occupation-related accidents”, which encompassed more risks.6 
The law still did not apply to domestic servants. Seamen and agricultural 
labourers were insured under separate laws. In the 1920s the accident laws 
had almost universal coverage. In 1929 the risque professionnel was extended 
to certain occupational diseases.
The debate about the RVB statistics 
Although the idea of a state insurance monopoly had been abandoned, the 
RVB was assigned a key role in the implementation and execution of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act. Because the insured had the right to opt out 
and the Act forced the RVB to apply a contribution system, the allocation 
of fi rms into risk categories developed into an important source of confl ict. 
If the statistical and fi nancial results deviated from the hypothetical risk, the 
RVB had to make adjustments accordingly. One point examined below is how 
statistical knowledge infl uenced the administration. 
Every company had to provide data on the type of company it was, the wages 
it paid, working hours, where it was registered, and with which insurance 
company it was insured with regard to the Workmen’s Compensation Act. 
Under the act the company insured the risk of its workforce, not of individual 
workers. The RVB received individual data only when a worker was injured. 
It recorded and checked all individual cases of injured workers, determined 
the level of entitlement and made sure medical treatment was provided. 
The insurer had to pay the bill but was not involved in claim settlement. As 
the law also aimed at preventing accidents at work, the RVB also collected 
 6  The executive structure was changed as well. The Labour Councils (Raden 
van Arbeid) became a kind of front offi ce of the RVB.
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data on accidents and promoted safety measures. Finally, it was also one of 
the insurers and had to act as such and thus safeguard its actuarial norms.7 
Therefore it had to process statistical data for its own management, as well 
as for the evaluation of the risk category classifi cation and to report on the 
success or otherwise of the act.
In 1904 the RVB set up a statistical department with 38 employees, inci-
dentally the same number as employed by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS).8 This number increased to 57 in 1910 and 110 in 1920. Although 
employers were required to provide information under the law, they often 
failed to do so either through lack of knowledge, insuffi cient administrative 
capacity, misinterpretation of the law or deliberate fraud. Close supervision by 
the RVB’s agents was necessary to obtain reliable data.9 The RVB intended to 
draft a statistical framework along the lines of the Austrian accident statistics, 
as recommended by the Internationale Gesellschaft für Arbeitershilfe.10  
The Workmen’s Compensation Act provided an opportunity to collect 
detailed statistics on companies that were insured under the law. This was 
an important development, as until then the business community had always 
refused to provide the data for statistics on enterprises. As the RVB needed 
these data for insurance purposes, it was the obvious authority to compile 
offi cial statistics on enterprises and publish them as part of the accident 
statistics. A proposal for this statistical framework was sent to the Central 
Commission for Statistics (CCS) in April 1904 for comment. In 1905 the 
Minister responsible approved the scheme in spite of the fact that the RVB 
and the CCS had not yet reached complete agreement on all details.11 The 
publication would consist of statistics on accidents by type of enterprise. The 
fi rst accident statistics, for 1903, were published in 1906 (fi gure 1).12 
The fi rst accident statistics were extremely detailed, running to nearly 500 
pages: 60 two-column pages for comment and analysis, and 420 pages of 
tables. The data were so meticulously subdivided, that it is doubtful if they 
were of any use for the general public. Data were classifi ed by 18 industrial 
branches and subdivided into more than 600 groups. As the compensation 
 7  The CCS recommended an annual assessment of the results of the RVB 
in its role as insurer. The RVB did not comply − a mistake, as the fi ve-yearly results 
demonstrated.
 8  Van Maarseveen, ‘A bird’s eye view’, 15. 
 9  It is very likely that the law produced an improvement of administrative 
capacity in many companies.
 10 RVB to the Minister, 13 June 1903. The draft had been drawn up and sent 
to the authorities in April 1904, National Archives (NA), 2.15.08, inv.nr. 223.
 11  4 August 1905, NA, 2.15.08 Arbeidersverzekering, inv. nr. 223.
 12  An overview of the main results of the accident statistics 1903-1942 has been 
published by Van der Does, De economische betekenis der sociale verzekering, 13-48.
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act allowed other insurance companies under the scheme, the numerical data 
on these contracts were kept separate and divided into as many columns. 
A regional subdivision was also included, to establish whether there were 
regional differences. 
The information recorded comprised times and causes of accidents, the kinds 
of injury resulting and the numbers of workers involved. This information was 
Figure 1. This table (reproduced on two pages) from the Accident Statistics on the number 
of enterprises, workmen and wages is only meant as a illustration of the large scale of the 
processing by the RVB , which was time and again criticized as too expensive and quite 
useless. The table distinguishes 18 sectors of industry, covering 625 subsectors: for every 
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expected to result in more accurate risk assessment and more effective safety 
measures. The RVB’s actuaries felt confi dent that a detailed registration and 
statistical analysis of the accidents would pay off. However, in the long run 
this expectation did not come true: analysis showed that accidents occurred 
subsector the number of enterprises, workmen and wages classifi ed by insurer is assessed.
Source: Ongevallenstatistiek betreffende het tijdvak 1 februari 1903-31 december 
1903 (Amsterdam 1906) 92-93
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erratically and therefore eluded purely mathematical probability.13 For this 
reason, subjective technical assessment of labour conditions in the individual 
workplaces remained an important factor in risk assessment. 
The subsequent story of Dutch industrial accident statistics can be char-
acterised as a process of gradual reduction in the number of the classifi ed 
and published data. The RVB realised that registration made sense only if all 
changes were accurately reported. Data such as those on machinery used in 
factories soon became outdated. In the statistics on 1906, published in 1911, 
several categories were discontinued. 
In the meantime, the private Risico-Bank criticised the RVB statistics as 
being far too detailed and therefore in many respects useless. The RVB lost 
the battle. It anticipated a request from the Ministry to reduce the detail and 
asked actuary K. Lindner to suggest (drastic) reductions. He proposed to 
focus on three topics: fi nancial data about the accidents (relevant for all the 
insurers), comparative data on the RVB and commercial insurers, and accident 
fi gures.14 Details on accidents and specifi cs on allowances were to be kept 
concise and the regional subdivision was restricted. The changes reduced the 
publication on 1907 (in 1913) to 150 pages, but failed to solve the notorious 
delay in publication. 
The CCS pushed the other way. In the early twenties it recommended that 
statistics on accident causes – which had been discontinued – be resumed. The 
statistics on 1918 and 1919, published in 1925, were compiled accordingly. 
In 1927 the RVB statistics came under discussion again, this time because of 
cuts in public spending, and the RVB had to drop the statistics on accident 
causes again, although the International Labour Organisation (ILO) thought 
them important.15 As a result of the ILO conference in 1929, the statistics on 
accident causes were resumed.16 
 13  Verslag Rijksverzekeringsbank (RVB) 1929, 8; Rapport risico-overdracht. Bijlage 
III, 59-64.
 14 Jaarverslag der Centrale Commissie voor de Statistiek (CCS) over het jaar 1912, 
90-94; Ongevallenstatistiek 1907, III en IV.
 15  Report by the Van IJsselsteyn Committee on the costs of social insurance, 
supplement A. The RVB objected (27 June 1927), but had to give in (17 November 
1927), NA, 2.15.08 Archief Arbeidersverzekering, inv. nr. 226.
 16  In 1932 it was decided to publish these statistics every fi ve years, NA, 2.15.08 
Archief Arbeidersverzekering, inv. nr. 218; Dossier Ongevallenstatistiek RVB, RVB 
to CBS, 3 November 1932, CBS archives.
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The debate about the RVB statistics on risk classifi cation
While the fi rst fi ve-yearly balance sheet of the RVB showed a defi cit, De 
Risico-Bank had been very successful. Furthermore, it claimed to charge con-
siderably less than the RVB.17 Generally speaking, De Risico-Bank insured the 
large companies: it had fewer enterprises under contract, but insured a higher 
proportion of the wage total. The majority of small and medium-sized busi-
nesses were insured with the RVB. The RVB had to work in a competitive 
market, but was not allowed to turn down bad risk applicants or to end the 
contract if a fi rm proved to be too accident-prone. Under these circumstances 
adverse risk selection could occur. As the law dictated a contributory system, 
a detailed classifi cation of enterprises in risk categories was essential. When-
ever a trade was classifi ed too low, the RVB would not only lose money on its 
standing contracts, but also on enterprises that had recently joined the RVB 
because of the low level of contributions. 
RVB analysts blamed two factors for the defi cit: a fundamental error in the 
proportional distribution of administrative costs between the RVB and the 
approved commercial insurance companies, and a mistaken classifi cation of 
the docking industry. Additionally, the actuaries, especially J.H. Peek, also 
blamed the problem of risk transfer from the commercial fi rms to the RVB: 
in their opinion it had resulted in adverse risk selection. These comments 
served to provoke De Risico-Bank. Time and again it criticised the RVB’s 
management of its accident insurance, its administrative costs, the way in 
which it collected and used statistics and government administration of social 
insurance in general. 
The distribution of administrative costs was adjusted in 1908, and the 
docking industry was classifi ed in a higher risk category. In response to this, 
the docking industry opted out and joined De Risico-Bank. However, the RVB 
retained its defi cit and was forced to raise contributions. In 1914 the defi cit 
was eliminated and the rates were gradually readjusted.
Risk adjustment on the basis of statistical analysis became an important 
issue. The law allowed the RVB to take into account greater variance in risk 
and attribute a higher risk to certain sectors or companies.18 Initially the RVB 
could not use these powers because it did not have enough statistical data for 
well-founded assessments, but from 1908 this option was put into practice. 
The right of appeal, however, often resulted in the RVB’s decision being 
nullifi ed. In reaction to this, a measure was introduced making it possible to 
classify an enterprise in a higher risk class by Royal Decree. For many years 
the appeal boards thought they had no authority to review a Royal Decree, 
 17  De Risico-bank, 12 (1917) 58. 
 18  Clause 73 in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
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but this changed in 1920 when the central board of appeal overruled the clas-
sifi cation of a fi rm based on a Royal Decree. This statistics-based calculation 
of risk was rejected by the judicial authorities because they had insuffi cient 
knowledge of statistical methods.19 
More importantly, the statistical method was accepted only for large manu-
facturing companies. Later on the use of the statistical method to change risk 
classifi cation was often rejected.20 The RVB, on the other hand, was of the 
opinion that re-examination of the classifi cation was a necessary instrument 
for a sound fi nancial policy as long as the contributory system remained in 
effect. Although the RVB’s actuary had declared that a pay-as-you-go system 
was feasible, or even preferable, it was only introduced in 1935.
It is diffi cult to explain why De Risico-Bank was so critical of the RVB’s 
classifi cation policy, as it did not concern its own clients. The decisions were 
discussed in its periodical, De Risico-bank, and the legality of the policy was 
questioned. It argued that public accountability was impossible if decisions 
were made by Royal Decree and that risk assessment for individual enterprises 
subverted the very idea of social insurance. In theory the policy could change 
the competitiveness of De Risico-Bank, if it was applied to low risk enterprises 
as well, but it was probably just an example of competition. The dispute about 
risk rating does illustrate that statistical methods were not generally accepted, 
or rather looked upon with distrust.  
The RVB and the growth of national social statistics 
In the eyes of the CCS, the introduction of the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act in 1901 created an excellent opportunity for the development of statistics 
on the economic and social conditions in Dutch industry. These had not been 
compiled up to then because employers refused to co-operate with a general 
business survey. In 1903 the CCS asked the Ministry of the Interior to use 
the RVB data to compile statistics on the structure of industry and on the 
wages that were insured.21 
 19  Schröder, ‘Een organische fout’, 443-444
 20  ‘statistical method’: the actuary analysed the history of accidents for com-
panies that showed particularly high accident fi gures. To eliminate chance, he made 
some adjustments and recalculated the rating, applying the theory of probabilities. 
Verslag RVB 1909, 69-72; Schröder, ‘Een organische fout’, 432-437; Sch (Schröder), 
‘Nog een organisatorisch vraagstuk’, 61-64.
 21  CCS to the Minister of the Interior, 13 June 1903, NA, 2.15.08 Archief 
Arbeidersverzekering, inv. nr. 223.
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The RVB was not interested in statistics on wages, and was willing to hand 
over the wage data to the CBS as long as confi dentiality was guaranteed. 
However, the data were of poor quality: a test for the province of Gelderland 
showed shortcomings in the wage data and additional information was needed. 
The test also made it evident that compilation of annual wage statistics on a 
national scale would be too expensive; instead each branch of industry was 
to be examined every fi ve years.22 The problem of how to collect additional 
information was solved in 1912, when the CBS was permitted to distribute 
questionnaires through the RVB’s channels.23 
In the mid 1920s – during a period of heavy budget cuts − the Minister 
of Labour questioned the whole idea of publication of the RVB social se-
curity data. His point was that the value of these statistics as a whole was 
very restricted because the results were published with considerable delay. 
Publication was also too costly.24 The CCS averted this threat by referring to 
the scarcity of social data and the continuing negative attitude of employers 
towards economic and social statistics of enterprises. It was decided to publish 
statistics on specifi c topics every fi ve years. In the late 1930s the discussions 
started all over again.
   
The debate about the RVB medical data
Apart from a weekly benefi t, the Workmen’s Compensation Act also provided 
for the medical treatment of injured labourers. This resulted in a great deal of 
work for the medical profession and a considerable improvement in profes-
sional care of injured workers. Nevertheless, some doctors were sceptical about 
the overall effects of the act. Their doubts were founded on a German study 
that indicated that insured workers took longer to recover than uninsured 
workers; the former were suspected of fraud, malingering and exaggerating 
their symptoms; their illness was called benefi t neurosis.25 
Although no quantitative Dutch data on accident victims existed before 1903, 
and an overview for 1903-1906 only became available at the end of 1911, some 
doctors expressed amazement about the time it took for accident victims to 
recover and get back to work. The idea that the law was being abused seems 
to have been widespread: even the annual report of the RVB mentioned that 
 22  Jaarverslag CCS 1909, 203-206.
 23  Van Dam van Isselt, ‘De sociaal-economische statistiek’, 56. Employers 
insured with an approved company were also required to supply wage sheets. 
 24  Jaarverslag CCS 1926, 20-23.
 25  Macalester Loup, ‘De vrucht van tien jaren ongevallenverzekering’, 13; 
Sajet, Geneeskundige beoordeeling, 499.
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victims were ‘less resilient’ than before.26 These complaints also originated 
from medical reports received by the RVB.27 
In 1912 the consequences of the law were discussed in more depth in the 
leading Dutch medical journal, the Nederlandsch Tijdschrift voor Geneeskunde. 
As it was not known whether the recovery period differed between insured 
and non-insured absentees, some contributors tried to fi nd proof by statistical 
comparison of insured and non-insured hospital patients, but no systematic 
differences were found. J.A. Korteweg, professor of surgery at Leyden Uni-
versity, took a special interest in the medical effects of the law. He tried to get 
access to the RVB’s archives for research, but met with opposition. During a 
meeting, the board of the RVB denied any problems, while Korteweg noted 
the possibility of moral degeneration.28 
In 1914 Korteweg petitioned the Minister of Agriculture, Trade and In-
dustry on the subject: he asked the Minister to promote mutual insurance 
funds and occupational therapy for the injured, and to encourage the medical 
profession to retain its dignity with respect to the problem of unnecessary 
visits.29 He was convinced that prolonged rest was harmful for patients with 
broken limbs, and that it was in the interest of full recovery for the patient 
to return to work as soon as possible. He argued that the medical data in the 
RVB’s archives should be processed in order to corroborate the weaknesses of 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act.30 The Minister lent a ready ear, and had 
Korteweg appointed at the RVB to conduct medical statistical research. This 
appointment proved to be controversial and caused a great deal of trouble.
The relationship between injury and duration of incapacity had never been 
investigated before. Korteweg had to reconstruct his cases from the admin-
istrative system, which had not been set up with medical research in mind. 
Although the results of Korteweg’s study were controversial, the RVB decided 
to publish the fi rst results. In December 1915 the actuary of the RVB, Lindner, 
criticised Korteweg’s statistical methods: he was careless in processing data and 
in the application of the theory of probabilities and therefore could not claim 
 26  Verslag RVB (1904) 53. The RVB was equally suspicious of doctors, who 
sometimes paid unnecessary visits in order to maximise their income or complied 
with the patients’ demands to remain registered as ill. Once the NMG (Nederlandse 
Maatschappij ter bevordering van de Geneeskunst) had labelled such conduct as injuri-
ous to the medical profession, it gradually disappeared. Intensive checks by the RVB 
were also effective.
 27  Idem (1905) 56 and (1908) 42.
 28  Korteweg, ‘Gevolgen der Ongevallenwet en geneeskundige statistiek’, 44-
45. 
 29  Idem, Adres aan de Minister van Landbouw, Handel en Nijverheid. 
 30  Ibidem, 7; idem, ‘Gevolgen’, 46.
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to be a ‘statistical authority’.31 The disagreement became quite intense, and 
Korteweg turned to the Minister. As it became clear that Korteweg ignored 
the critical comments on his statistical methods, the RVB refused to approve 
publication of future articles, unless they were published in its own periodical 
and accompanied by a scientifi c note by the actuary. This was all the more 
important as Korteweg was an authority in medicine, and people would not 
lightly criticise his methods.32 
As was stated above, Korteweg’s appointment was controversial, so 
controversial that it was discussed in Parliament in 1916. Some members 
disapproved of him being allowed to do research in the archives because 
his articles indicated that he was highly critical of the effects of the law and 
that he advocated its revision. The Minister defended his original decision: 
Korteweg’s name guaranteed erudition and impartiality, and his work was 
certainly not aimed at collecting evidence to support a biased position, but 
at drawing conclusions from facts.33 In 1914 Korteweg had formulated the 
hypothesis that ‘the unwanted consequences of the Act were long periods 
of healing, and poor results.’34 It is therefore no wonder that some people 
questioned his impartiality.
In 1917 the actuary Lindner published his objections to Korteweg’s statistical 
methods and analysed his publications on medical statistics. He accused him 
of being prejudiced and only wanting to prove that disablement was mainly 
a state of mind. Korteweg published his defence in the same issue.35 He did 
not give in and stuck to the idea that ‘mathematical statistics do not cover 
the whole issue’ and that ‘medical statistics are a different matter’.36 Lindner 
knew beforehand that he would not be able to convince Korteweg, but it was 
the only way to limit the damage and warn the medical profession against the 
fallacies of misunderstanding the real nature of statistics.
With the support of the Ministry, Korteweg was able to continue his 
research in the RVB’s archives, albeit no longer at the RVB’s expense. His 
 31  RVB to the Minister, 14 March 1917, NA, 2.15.08 Arbeidersverzekering, 
inv. nr. 213, Medical accident statistics. 
 32  Ibidem.
 33  The proceedings were also published in Tijdschrift voor Ongevallengeneeskunde 
1 (1916) 27-30.
 34  Korteweg, ‘Gevolgen’, 46: ‘de ongewenste nevenwerking der wet oorzaak 
is van den langeren genezingsduur en het slechtere resultaat.’
 35  Lindner, ‘De methode van prof. Korteweg’s medisch-statistische onderzoe-
kingen’; ‘Antwoord’; ‘Naschrift’; Korteweg, ‘Mijne opvattingen in zake de beschuldi-
gingen van den Wiskundigen Adviseur’; ‘Terugblik op mijne onderzoekingen over de 
schouderontwrichtingen’. 
 36  Ibidem, 315. ‘Naar mijne meening omvat de “mathematische statistiek” niet 
alle statistiek, maar is de geneeskundige statistiek een ander soort statistiek, …’
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relationship with the Ministry was excellent, that with the RVB quite the op-
posite. In 1919 he considered ‘to replace my crusade against the abuse of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act with one against the poor quality of doctors in 
Amsterdam working for the health funds’.37 Even though the RVB disagreed 
with Korteweg’s ideas on misuse of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he 
did have some infl uence on RVB procedures. At his request the RVB indexed 
the medical records by subject. And his request to resume the publication 
of regional data was honoured, although never implemented because of the 
budget cuts in the early 1920s.38 
In 1922 Korteweg was appointed a consultant to De Risico-Bank, but contin-
ued to act as special adviser for the assessment of X-rays. The RVB increased 
its own research activities: it drew up a report on health-fund doctors and 
examined the differences between fractures treated in hospital by a consultant 
and those treated at home by a general practitioner, and between insured and 
non-insured patients.39 The debate on whether social insurance only relieves 
the effects of disablement or may also cause a prolonged period of disablement 
has never been settled satisfactorily.
Over the years adaptability became more important, resulting in re-exam-
ination and a lower disability assessment. Initially, a labourer was certifi ed 
as incapacitated if recovery was not to be expected within a year. Physicians, 
however, argued that people would adapt to the loss of an eye, and this justi-
fi ed a lower incapacity rate in the future. This became standard practice and 
over time further changes were introduced.40 Overall, medical examinations 
became more rigid.41 In 1920 the change in policy was debated by SH (the 
physician Heijermans), in the periodical Sociale Voorzorg (Social Prevention). 
SH stated that the RVB had either never monitored the disabled properly, 
 37  ‘mijn kruistocht tegen de misbruiken bij de toepassing der Ongevallenwet 
thans tegen het slechtere type der Amsterdamsche fondsdokters te gaan richten.’ Health 
fund doctors were employed by health funds or managed a health fund of their own’, 
15 september, NA 2.15.08, Archief Arbeidersverzekering, inv. nr. 216.
 38  Idem, 11-3-1921, Korteweg to the Minister; 28 May 1921, RVB to the 
Minister.
 39  Mossel, ‘Uitkomstberekening van den behandelingsduur’, 380. With 
reference to the debate in 1917 the author did not dare to call his article ‘statistical 
research’. Brocx shared his opinion, but also referred to the unreliability of the data. 
Brocx, ‘Voordracht’, 4-5. It may indicate that Lindner’s attack on Korteweg’s use of 
medical statistics had been counter-productive.
 40  The same may have happened for other injuries. Adaptation of the workplace 
might have produced the same result. Since 1909 the RVB employed technical inspec-
tors to inspect workplaces. Legal verdicts forced the RVB in the same direction. 
 41  Sajet, Geneeskundige beoordeling, 498.
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or had changed its system into a ‘squeezing system’.42 Lindner acknowledged 
that over the years more and more people had been tested on adaptability, 
resulting in lower benefi ts or withdrawal of the benefi t altogether. In his view 
the law contained a fl aw as it insured income from the original occupation, 
not from the earning capacity after the accident.43 It proved to be impossible 
to measure work capacity, at least medical professionals working with accident 
victims had not even tried to defi ne a measure for it, and therefore disability 
assessment would always remain subjective.44 Statistical techniques had failed 
to predict accidents, and medical science could not defi ne disablement. 
The debate about national sickness benefi t statistics 
The dispute about the accident statistics played an important part in the 
decision-making process on the required statistics under the later Sickness 
Benefi t Act. In the Netherlands, sickness benefi ts and health insurance were 
provided by numerous small-scale local mutual funds, by local funds organised 
by doctors, and by commercial and company funds. 
From an international perspective it is interesting to note that Dutch ac-
cident statistics included the temporarily disabled as well, and continued to 
do so after the introduction of sick pay. Elsewhere injured labourers were 
insured under a sickness benefi t act that already existed.45 In the Netherlands, 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act was for many years the only state insurance 
for Dutch workers. National and compulsory sickness benefi t regulations were 
eventually introduced in 1930, health provisions not until 1941. The Dutch 
system was also exceptional because rules for sick pay and medical treatment 
were introduced separately, which complicated the compilation of sickness 
and health statistics. 
The ongoing debate about the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the RVB 
infl uenced the debate on the organisation of national sickness benefi t. To put it 
briefl y: the RVB, indeed the whole idea of state administration, was considered 
suspect as the hostility between the private sector and government administra-
tion continued, although perhaps somewhat less so during the 1914-1918 war. 
The private sector was strongly opposed to external control of its information 
and the implicit obligation to pay extra for detailed national statistics. 
 42  SH, ‘Sociaal medische kroniek’, 666-667, (Dutch text:‘knijpsysteem’).
 43  Lindner, ‘Wetenschap of willekeur?’, 380-383. The problem arose after the 
revision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1921. 
 44  Lindner, ‘Het invaliditeitspercentage’, 679.
 45  Hennock, British social reform and German precedents, 3; Klosse, Menselijke 
schade vergoeden of herstellen? 65-66.
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Figure 2. Expenses under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the risks insured 
(1903-1939)
Source: 50 jaren sociale verzekering 1901-1951 (Amsterdam, 1951) 25
Medical expenses
Benefits during the 
fi rst six weeks after an 
accident
Disability pensions
Widow and dependents 
pensions
Benefi ts paid out
After the amendment of 1922 the Workmen’s Compensation Act covered all industrial 
workers resulting in more benefi t payments.
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The problem was that the RVB apportioned considerable ‘administrative 
costs’ to the insurers. It charged two categories of costs: general management 
costs, for things like processing statistics, and costs related to accident assess-
ment and decision-making. The periodical De Risico-bank complained time 
and again about these administrative costs and questioned their legitimacy 
and necessity. In their view the Workmen’s Compensation Act was much too 
expensive (fi gure 2). The system as a whole was undeniably expensive, all the 
more so as De Risico-Bank developed its own infrastructure: branch offi ces, a 
technical department for accident prevention, its own statistical processing 
department, medical consultants under contract, etc. The high administrative 
costs of the compensation act were used as a powerful argument in debates on 
government versus private implementation of compulsory sickness benefi t. 
The fi rst sickness benefi t regulations were organised along private lines. 
The Wet op het Arbeidscontract (Collective Labour Agreement Act), effected in 
1909, introduced paid sick leave twenty years before sickness benefi t legislation 
was eventually enacted.46 This act encouraged private insurance, including 
company funds, and stimulated De Risico-Bank to develop mutual sickness 
insurance funds. The way this act provided for paid sick leave reinforced the 
position of the industry in the debate. A government system for sick pay was 
not in the interest of the employers, as it involved external control over the 
workforce. 
When, in the aftermath of World War I, the RVB started administering 
provisions for old people, the chairman of the administrative offi ce of De 
Risico-Bank, F.E. Posthuma, tried to prevent the same happening to sickness 
benefi t. He orchestrated a campaign in favour of private implementation.47 
As a result the sickness benefi t law was postponed again, but in the long run 
his initiative was successful. 
The defl ationary Dutch economic policy during the post-war economic 
recession demanded lower labour costs and budget cuts. Once again the RVB 
came under attack. Nevertheless, its increased input of technical and medical 
staff seemed to be successful. Compared with other countries, the number of 
fatal accidents and permanent benefi ts was much lower. Moreover, accident 
costs in terms of a percentage of the insured wage had decreased over time 
(from 1.85 percent in 1906 to 0.93 in 1920).48 However, these statistical argu-
ments did not impress the opponents of government administration. 
 46  In most collective agreements, sick pay was granted for thirteen weeks. Com-
panje, ‘Geneeskundige zorg voor inwonend dienstpersoneel, 1890-1910’, 26-31.
 47  Hoogenboom, Standenstrijd en zekerheid, 191-196; De Risico-bank 15 (1920) 
75-76; 83-84.
 48  Lindner, ‘Het departementale plan tot hervorming der sociale verzekering’, 
29-30. 
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The failure of sickness benefi t statistics
As sickness and health insurance were mainly locally organised, it was very 
diffi cult to compile national statistics. In August 1920 the Minister of Labour, 
P.J.M. Aalberse, presented a health bill. His compulsory health insurance 
scheme proposed to include statistical monitoring as well. The CCS discussed 
the topic in 1921 and formed a sub-committee for health and sickness statistics. 
As the tide turned against state interference and cutbacks began to dominate 
the political agenda, the CCS decided to drop the matter as it was unlikely 
that an increase in staff would be granted.49 
In the sickness benefi t legislation (1929) the idea of private implementation 
of a collective provision was fully applied. Private bodies were entitled to insure 
sickness benefi ts, verify the claim and pay the allowance, in the same way as 
the public Raden van Arbeid (Labour Councils). Most enterprises chose to 
insure their workforce with the private Bedrijfsverenigingen (industrial insur-
ance boards). Only 10 percent of workers were insured with the public Labour 
Councils. The newly created supervisory Insurance Council (Verzekeringsraad) 
was responsible for developing a statistical system, setting administrative rules 
and publishing an annual report in which the data of all private and public 
sickness insurance agencies had to be incorporated. 
The insurance council developed a system for sickness insurance statistics 
and submitted it to the CCS. The system required individual registration of 
sick persons. However, the private boards did not record any specifi c details 
on individuals, as they had no legal obligation to do so and the insurance was 
collective: enterprises insured their whole workforce. Therefore the Federa-
tion (of industrial insurance boards)50 insisted that they were not able to break 
down the workers who were recorded as sick into age categories (as the labour 
councils and the CCS wanted) as they did not have individual information 
in their registers. Their sickness benefi t data were not suitable for health 
statistics for another reason too: no diagnosis was recorded. The Federation 
considered it unacceptable that the CCS was trying to pass on the costs for 
sickness and health statistics to the private insurance organisations, which 
were funded by employers and employees. In their view public authorities 
alone should bear the costs for offi cial statistics.51 Therefore, these efforts to 
 49  Dossier Ongevallenstatistiek, Report of the sub-committee to the CCS, 31 
Oktober 1922; CCS to the director-general of the CBS, 11-11-1922, CBS archives, 
inv. nr. 612.
 50  The majority of the industrial insurance boards were organised in the Fed-
eration, a sub-section of De Risico-Bank. It acted as spokesman for private interests. 
 51  Dossier Ziekteverzekeringsstatistiek tot 1933, Comment on the draft pro-
posal, 24 December 1931, CCS archives.
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develop uniform national sickness statistics failed.52 The statistics that were 
published in the annual report were divided into public and private data. It 
was impossible to compare the results.53
 The same underlying problem of the costs involved reinforced the posi-
tion of the RVB and even that of the CBS to some extent. To economise on 
social security, the insurance council (instituted in 1929) was dissolved on 1 
March 1934 and its responsibilities transferred to the RVB. In principle, the 
RVB did not reject the idea of contracting out the work to the CBS, unless 
it had to guarantee the quality of the data.54 The head of the CBS, H.W. 
Methorst pleaded his case with the Minister of Social Affairs. The principle 
of centralisation made the CBS the obvious authority: mechanical processing 
was cheaper, extra information could be generated by linking sickness statis-
tics with other data, and the national collection of data on the distribution 
of disease was especially important for public health. It would cost less and 
yield more if the CBS processed the statistics.55 The RVB agreed to transfer 
the technicalities to the CBS, but the Minister refused to give his approval. 
The RVB also explained that the problems regarding the collection of data 
on individuals had not yet been solved.56 
In the meantime H.W. Groeneveld reiterated that statistics were not a 
priority for the Federation,57 even expressing doubts about the value of sta-
tistical knowledge at all. The RVB’s wish to produce statistics that were more 
scientifi c ‘may sound good, but the experiences with the accident insurance 
statistics show that scientifi c statistics are costly and quite useless. Thousands 
of guilders are wasted on such statistics, which nobody reads and which, when 
they are published – usually years after the year to which they refer – are no 
longer of interest to anyone.’58 
 52  Doss. Ziekteverzekeringsstatistiek 1928-1940; in August the insurance coun-
cil gave in, in December 1931 the CCS, CCS archives. Dossier Ongevallenstatistiek, 
26 August 1931, CBS archives , inv. nr. 612.
 53  The insurance boards did not count the number of sick people insured with 
their own employer: the so-called own-risk bearers.
 54  Dossier Ongevallenstatistiek, Schröder to Methorst, 19 Oktober 1934, CBS 
archives, inv. nr. 612. 
 55  Methorst to the Minister 24 October 1934, NA, 2.15.08, Arbeidersverze-
kering, inv. nr. 516. 
 56  Idem, RVB to the Minister of Social Affairs, 19 February 1935; 6 March 
1935, the Minister to Methorst.
 57  Idem, 6 December 1935, Groeneveld to the secretary general of the Ministry. 
Groeneveld was head of the department of social insurance at the Ministry. Since the 
early 1920s he had favoured implementation of social insurance by both public and 
private agencies. 
 58  Idem, draft 14 November 1935, never sent to the RVB. The quote is from 
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The efforts of the RVB and the national organisation of the labour councils 
to force a decision in favour of comprehensive statistics failed.59 The costs 
were too high, the collective character made them unfeasible, and there was a 
great risk that sickness insurance statistics would fall short of expectations as 
had happened with the accident statistics. And last, but not least, the private 
industrial insurance boards already collected all the data they needed.60 The 
letter to the CCS also referred to the poor economic conditions.
 
Conclusion
The Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1901 and the Social Insurance Bank 
(RVB), instituted to implement the act and manage the processes involved, 
created a fi nancial, organisational and medical structure to help injured work-
ers (fi gure 3). Initially planned as a government system, in the end private 
insurers were also allowed to participate. This law seems to have been the 
fi rst national example of a hybrid, public and private implementation of social 
security. Involvement of employers – and in due course of labour unions – 
became an important characteristic of the Dutch welfare state. In actual fact, 
the freedom of choice between public and private related only to the choice of 
insurer; the RVB – a government agency – collected and processed statistical 
data on companies, wages and injured workers, decided on entitlements of 
injured workers and provided the benefi t and medical treatment. The em-
ployers were only met halfway. It took many years before they acquired any 
executive power in the area of social security. And – indirectly – they had to 
pay for public statistics. 
Compared with other countries, like Belgium, Germany and France, the 
Dutch authorities had little information about social and economic conditions 
in industry, and they were not prepared to pay for it either. Added to this, 
the business community refused to provide social and economic information. 
Therefore the introduction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act seemed a 
perfect opportunity to remedy this. The act required employers to provide 
data that would enable the government to compile national statistics on en-
a comment on the question by Groeneveld. ‘Dat klinkt heel mooi, maar de met de 
Ongevallenwet opgedane ervaring heeft doen zien het kostbare en nogal nutteloze 
van zulke wetenschappelijke statistieken. Er worden duizenden guldens verprutst aan 
zulke statistieken, die niemand leest en niemand op het oogenblik van haar verschijnen 
– meest eenige jaren na het jaar waarover de statistiek loopt – meer interesseren!’
 59  Ibidem. 
 60  Idem, 23 December 1935, the Minister to the RVB.
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Source: De Notenkraker 20.3.1910. Photo collection of the International Institute 
for Social History Amsterdam
Figure 3. The compensation act in practice.
According to this cartoon in the socialist periodical De Notenkraker the injured worker 
was always suspected of cheating.
terprises and wages. The statistical authorities, especially the CCS, were very 
much aware of this opportunity.
The decision to give the RVB the task of compiling national statistics on 
enterprises was based on the notion that accident rates differed between 
sectors of industry. The RVB received all the individual dossiers on injured 
workers, including those insured by private parties. Conditions relating to the 
accidents – like time, place, company and sector of industry, level of wages, 
nature of the accident, age – were also monitored. Unfortunately no relation-
ships were discovered and the statistics on causes of industrial accidents were 
discontinued. The initial statistical system of the RVB was very detailed and 
ambitious, and publication of the results was far behind schedule. Nevertheless, 
the insurance data were suitable for new social and economic statistics.
The statistics produced by the RVB led to an intense and long-lasting public 
debate. Private insurers, De Risico-Bank in particular, argued from the begin-
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ning that collecting and processing many of these data involved high costs, 
and that they were irrelevant for a good assessment of the Workmen’s Com-
pensation Act. Their criticism was effective: the 1907 statistics (published in 
1913) were much less detailed, and subsequently the statistics focused mainly 
on (fi nancial) management information and the number of accidents only. 
This did not silence the critics, however. Time and again De Risico-Bank 
expressed its doubts about whether the statistics justifi ed the costs. This is 
understandable: since 1908 employers who had joined approved private insur-
ers were no longer classifi ed. They simply insured their workforce as a whole 
and had to pay their part in the real costs of their private insurance fund. 
Providing detailed company information to the RVB was certainly not high 
on their list of priorities and was even experienced as unwanted interference 
in their private business. The outspoken criticism of the private sector and 
the need to economise on public spending resulted in more reductions of the 
RVB statistics in the 1920s and 1930s. However, the statistics on causes of 
accidents was resumed after the ILO Conference in 1929. 
In its role as an insurer, the RVB was in a completely different position than 
the private insurers. The contributions that companies had to pay into the 
insurance funds depended on the wages of their workers and the estimated 
accident risk. It was the responsibility of the RVB to place the companies 
in the appropriate risk categories, and it had to justify this classifi cation on 
the basis of its experience and particularly statistical information. The idea 
that comparable trades and sectors of industry carried comparable risks soon 
proved to be mistaken. Accidents did not show a suffi ciently reliable pattern 
to construct an uncontested system of classifi cation. Coincidence and human 
error could not be captured in statistical techniques. Managerial qualities, 
organisational structure and workforce discipline turned out to be impor-
tant variables. Nevertheless the RVB’s actuary did try to develop a statistical 
method to assess risks and thus classify the companies. In the 1920s this 
statistical risk assessment lost ground after the Central Court of Appeal had 
overturned its validity.
In the contribution system used by the RVB, it was crucial that companies 
were classifi ed in the right risk category, while the rival private insurance 
organisation, De Risico-Bank, had decided on a pay-as-you-go system, in 
which real costs were apportioned among the participants. The classifi cation 
problem had become so important because of the fi nancial defi cits of the RVB 
in the period 1903-1908. To some extent, these defi cits were the result of the 
fact that employers were free to choose between public and private insurers. 
Depending on how they were classifi ed, companies chose the most profi table 
option for themselves: the RVB or a private fund. The answer was a system 
of frequent classifi cation – which approached an individual risk assessment 
for large enterprises. 
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 Statistics also had a central place in another lively debate: the discussion 
about the medical situation of injured workers. Many doctors suspected that 
compensation encouraged longer periods of incapacity. Korteweg, an infl uen-
tial surgeon at the time, strongly opposed the Workmen’s Compensation Act 
and the RVB, and voiced the feelings of many doctors. He was given access 
to the RVB data, but did not succeed in proving his theories with the help of 
statistics. At the same time, the medical staff of the RVB faced the diffi cult 
task of assessing the incapacity percentages of injured workers. Their search 
for a standard measurement method had little success and elicited a great 
deal of criticism. The growing experience with eye injuries shifted attention 
to people’s highly individual adaptability.61 This approach developed into a 
practice of periodical re-examination. 
Again, the existence of a large private insurance sector and the refusal of 
the state to pay for statistical information played a decisive negative role in 
the development of a comprehensive Sickness Benefi t Act. Around 1900, the 
Dutch sickness benefi t funds – which had been set up in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries – were small, private and strictly local. Integration of 
information about health at a national level was impossible. The debate about 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the statistical policies of the RVB 
had evoked so many critical comments on the part of private parties that the 
introduction of a comprehensive sickness benefi t act as well as compilation 
of the corresponding statistics was subject to a long delay. 
Not until 1929 did the fi rst compulsory sickness benefi t act come into exis-
tence. The act granted equal executive powers to private and public insurance 
agencies. Most workers were insured with private mutual industrial insurance 
boards. This development still made it impossible to compile uniform national 
sickness statistics. Again, the employers’ Risico-Bank opposed external control 
and the compilation of more data than actually needed for the implementa-
tion of the insurance. 
 
 61  When the act was revised in 1921, it became possible to undergo vocational 
retraining paid for by the insurance. Very few people made use of this option), and 
retraining often failed.

